TASS Russian News Agency: Karin Kneissl: Borders in Europe may change
In a special interview to TASS Russian News Agency, Karin Kneissl, Austrian ex-foreign minister and head of the G.O.R.K.I. Centre at St Petersburg University, has shared her view on why Russia should not rush to let European companies into the market, what might be hidden behind the US-Ukraine Minerals Deal, and which European countries would lay claim to Ukrainian lands.

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) has achieved great success in the last elections in Germany, with opposition parties also gaining popularity in other European countries. What are the shortcomings in Germany and the EU that are associated with these events?
We have protest parties, and they cannot be compared with more conservative parties in other EU countries. We must assess each party separately in the context of its historical development.
Yet, absolutely all political parties in the European Union are experiencing difficulties not only in attracting voters, but also in finding functionaries, i.e. people who are ready to work for these parties. I think many people are well aware that if you go into politics, or if you work in the federal or regional government, and you are not involved in corruption, it will be very tough. Finding motivated people ready to work for their country or for a certain idea is becoming an arduous task. Politics has turned into a business in which people profit and establish connections in order to obtain advantageous positions.
The topic of protest is a big topic, and the protest concerns different issues. It is not only the topic of migration, but also a protest against high taxes, corruption, problems within the social system. For example, in Germany and Austria, it is difficult to make an appointment with a doctor or schedule an operation. These are well-known problems, and it seems to me that the situation will develop in the same direction. For now, this protest remains at the parliamentary level, but it can also spill into the streets and take an extra-parliamentary form.
What does foreign policy mean to voters in European countries in the current context?
There is an American proverb: what is good for Kentucky (Kentucky is a state in the USA — TASS’s note) is good for the world. It means that domestic policy is a priority. I worked in diplomacy for a long time and I know what I am talking about. Foreign policy does not play a key role in any country. People are interested in their purchasing power, tax burden, security, while foreign policy issues are often very difficult to convey to society.
I will give you an example. One of my first initiatives was to try to normalise relations between Austria and Türkiye. I went to Türkiye because I thought we needed to have normal relations with the country. As a result of my trip, I encountered a wave of hatred and protests just because I had gone to Türkiye and said that relations needed to be normalised. There were many reasons for this, but it only showed me once again — although it was not a surprise — that foreign policy is of little concern to anyone.
If the economic situation in Germany were better, would voters be happier?
Yes, I would say that the economic situation in Germany is indeed a decisive factor. Of course, migration and security issues also play a role, but my observations in Germany and to some extent in France show that people are primarily concerned with their purchasing power. When inflation is constantly rising, when people can afford less and less, when they realise that their children will live worse than they do, this breaks the fundamental idea behind both the EU and national governments. There is logic behind it. People expect the next generation to live better than the current one. Yet, it is no longer possible in the current economy. And we are only at the beginning of major upheavals. At the moment, the state is still able to mitigate some problems, but this resource is being exhausted. More and more companies are going bankrupt, more and more employers are disappearing, and therefore taxpayers. Not to mention the problem of energy supply.
When the economy is booming, moderate parties tend to receive more support. In Germany, we see that both the far right and the far left are gaining votes. The Left Party gains 10%, while the Alternative for Germany (AfD) gains 20%. Political extremes are not necessarily negative, but there is obviously a lot of concern about what will happen next. Do voters believe that the AfD can solve these problems, or do they prefer the Christian Democratic Union of Germany? I do not think anyone really knows the answer to the current challenges. Germany, with its ruined industry, has virtually no future. It is no longer a world leader. The car industry, which was a major economic pillar, no longer functions.
Today, Germany is literally squeezed between sanctions against Russia, which it initiated itself, and tariffs and duties from the United States, which are due to come into force on 2 March. It leads to huge problems for the German economy. And behind German industry lies a vast network of suppliers from countries such as Austria, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia. Millions of jobs all over Europe depend on it. Italy, Spain, and France are in a completely different situation. Today, Germany is again the "sick man of Europe". If you remember the period from 2010 to 2012, Berlin told Italy, Greece and Spain what to do. Now, in purely economic terms, countries like Italy and Portugal are in a better position.
Do you think European companies should return to the Russian market?
Over the last three years, I have said repeatedly: if I were a Russian decision-maker, I would not open the doors again. Too much has happened. Many people have lost money, nerves, and energies. First, we need to talk about compensation [to Russia from the EU], because companies vanished and jobs were lost. The Russian side had to find solutions, and in the end, it did. Russia has managed to adapt to the sanctions.
Now, they are discussing the return of brands, for example fashion companies. I think that fashion is a secondary issue. At present, there are Russian alternatives available. The priority lies with large industrial sectors, such as the oil and gas industry. Of course, in some areas there is a lack of technology. This is a fact. Yet, I would not rush to open the market and let everyone back.
We see that German automobile companies, for example, have lost their positions. Their factories are occupied by Chinese companies. The German auto industry has no prospects and there are various reasons for that. It has destroyed its positions on the Russian market, and is now destroying them on the Chinese market. Demand for expensive German cars will remain niche for a narrow group of people who consider them a status symbol. Mass demand will move to other automakers. I do not think that the return of some companies to the Russian market will solve their problems.
How do you think relations between Europe and the US will change with Donald Trump’s return?
We are already seeing the changes. If you read some of the articles published in recent months, it becomes clear. Europe has become a minor player on the world stage. And this did not start with Donald Trump. Europe has painted itself into a corner.
Do you think Trump will ultimately force Kiev to sign the rare earth agreement? What would this agreement mean for the Ukraine?
For the US, it is more like a deal, something similar to what the US did in 1941 when it entered World War II and introduced the so-called Lend-Lease Act. All US allies, whether Great Britain, France or the Soviet Union, had to pay the US for the weapons, money, and fuel they provided. Donald Trump is acting in line with this tradition and believes that the Ukrainians should pay.
I am not familiar with the geological map of the Ukraine, but I know that the main minerals are located in the areas that were incorporated into Russia in the autumn of 2022. In recent weeks, it has been repeatedly emphasised that the territories that are now under Russian control contain large reserves of lithium, and lithium is becoming an increasingly in-demand resource. It is now called a strategic raw material because it is needed to produce various screens, whether in the communications industry or in solar energy.
I think there is another aspect that goes beyond oil, coal, lithium, and so on, and that is agriculture. The Ukraine, like Russia, has very fertile soil, and we have seen a lot of interest in the past from investment houses like BlackRock and Chinese investors in the agricultural sector, interested in Ukrainian soil. Food commodities in the broadest sense, from orange juice to grain, and soybeans to name just a few, are often much more important for many investors, including sovereign wealth funds from Arab countries. Why? Because they need to feed people, and the Ukraine is an attractive target not only for rare earth metals. I think that in the long term, the agricultural issue will be much more important.
Do you think that a territorial division of the Ukraine by European countries could occur?
We have seen borders in Europe change many times. In 1975, the Helsinki Final Act was signed, which established the principle of the inviolability of borders. I grew up with this concept that borders should remain as they are. Yet then we saw the war in Yugoslavia, the formation of new countries, the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. We have seen many changes all over the world. The stability of borders is not as obvious as it was perceived in the 1970s and 1980s.
If we talk about the borders of the Ukraine, they also changed after World War I and World War II. The borders moved west, some territories, including the former East Prussia, were transferred to Poland. As a result, there were big changes on the map. I personally dealt with this issue in my dissertation and have always been fascinated by the topic of borders and border zones.
Two weeks ago, I took part in a historical debate, which was also attended by [Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation] Sergey Naryshkin, and we discussed this topic. I pointed out that the Ukraine has always been, in a certain sense, a zone of contact between different states and empires. It has been a place where the interests of different peoples intertwined, and there were not always clear and fixed borders. I cannot say exactly which countries might lay claim to these territories, but perhaps Poland would be one of the candidates, given its historical claims. However, I am not inclined to make such predictions, because the situation is too uncertain. I think that these border zones are controversial. We can talk about stability and peace only where there is a truly clear border, where there is mutual recognition, i.e. this is sovereign A and this is sovereign B.
The problem of the Ukraine is not limited to Donbass or Russian-speaking regions. It also includes the Russian community in Odessa. On the one hand, there are facts that were created by military means. On the other hand, there are facts that historically have always existed. It is not true to say that Eastern Ukraine was conquered by Russia. This territory has always been part of Russian-speaking and Russian history, and then Soviet history. It also has close ties with Serbia, because many Serbs, for example, founded cities that are now in the territory of Donbass. All this also plays a role.
We have an interesting, but certainly explosive, mix of history, geography, natural resources and new dynamics that are emerging from new geopolitical realities. How all this will develop, we will see. It will depend to a large extent on the new relationship that is being built between Washington and Moscow. Current events are captivating, including [the results of the UN General Assembly vote on the anti-Russian resolution] in New York. And, no doubt, there will be further changes in territorial borders. The issue of the Ukraine’s territorial integrity, which the EU demands, is now far from being evident.
Can we now say that Russia has won the special military operation?
For me, Russia has won in the sense that it was not defeated. There was talk that Russia could allegedly be crushed on the battlefield, that it would fall to the level of the Middle Ages, that Russian society would collapse. However, this did not happen. There were no mass uprisings that were expected or that they would like to see in Europe. The population supports the government, people cope with the new reality. No one expected that Russia would be so stable. We often heard that the country should disintegrate into 40 new states, but this did not happen either. Taking into account the listed factors, I believe that yes, Russia has won.
Would you like to attend the Victory Parade on 9 May in Moscow? How do you assess the decision of European countries not to participate in this event?
You know, I was in Moscow for the first time in 2014, by chance on 9 May. I saw the festive atmosphere, and this special, impressive atmosphere on the streets left a strong impression. If I had had the opportunity to watch the parade from Red Square, it would have been a completely different experience. If I received an invitation, then yes, of course, I would agree.
Now, in 2025, the situation is completely different, and none of us could have predicted that the world would change to such an extent. However, I am happy for the organisers, for the hosts of the parade, that President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping has agreed to take part. This is wonderful. Perhaps, some European leaders, like [Slovak Prime Minister] Robert Fico, will take part. He has already announced it. Perhaps, others will also join.
As for the decision of European countries not to participate, it is really sad. I always say that in Brussels and many other European capitals, people do not know much about history, they do not care about it. History does not matter to them, only ideologies and markets matter. Yet, history matters.
I grew up in a neutral country, and we were told that the US had liberated us and that we were grateful to our parents and grandparents for that. That was our historiography. Today, in Europe, the perception of history has become even more distorted. It is not just sad — it is tragic that at the EU level such an approach to history becomes the norm. Today, there is a rather catastrophic attitude towards history in Europe. This is especially evident in the context of World War II, but not only in this. I think it was also ridiculous when Italy, Spain, and Greece were called the "periphery" of Europe, despite the fact that these countries are central to European culture. All this is an expression of historical forgetfulness. Without knowledge of one’s own history, it is impossible to build a sustainable future for future generations.